From neo-idealistic historicism to Geymonat’s materialistic and Agazzi’s objectivistic realism: the roots of the Italian philosophy of science

Niccolò Covoni, Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino, Urbino, Italy; Institute of Philosophy, University of Italian Switzerland USI, Lugano, Switzerland
Flavia Marcacci, Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino, Urbino, Italy
Gino Tarozzi, Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino, Urbino, Italy

Our paper explores the development of the philosophy of science in Italy, focusing on the shift away from the idealist and historicist dominance of Croce and Gentile. Ludovico Geymonat and Evandro Agazzi were central to this transformation, who embraced neopositivism’s anti-metaphysical stance while affirming science as a form of advanced knowledge grounded in philosophical reflection. Both thinkers proposed non-metaphysical realist positions: Geymonat emphasized realism based on experimental practice and dialectics, distancing himself from historical materialism, while Agazzi emphasized scientific objectivity, defining scientific objects through empirical methods. Despite differing foundations, their views converge on three key principles: the contextual nature of scientific truth, the interplay between theory and observation, and the necessity of a realist reinterpretation of quantum mechanics. The study concludes by examining their distinct readings of Bohr’s principle of complementarity, situating them within the broader discourse on the philosophical foundations of quantum theory.

Keywords: Philosophy of science. Objective realism. Dialectic materialism. Historicist Neo-idealism. Complementarity principle.